In the realm of cyber conflict, the dynamics between attackers and defenders can be understood through the lens of imperfect information games and asymmetric defense. Notably, cyber defenders often find themselves in a position akin to insurgents, facing an adversary with seemingly limitless resources and the advantage of choosing the time and place of attack. By examining these concepts and their implications, we can gain valuable insights into the challenges and strategies of cyber defense in an increasingly complex and uncertain landscape.
Imperfect information games provide a useful framework for understanding the strategic interactions between cyber attackers and defenders. In these games, players have incomplete knowledge about the actions, strategies, and payoffs of their opponents (Kaspersky, 2020). This information asymmetry is particularly pronounced in cyber conflict, where defenders often lack visibility into the capabilities, intentions, and tactics of their adversaries (Hou et al., 2022). Attackers can exploit this uncertainty by employing deception, misdirection, and surprise, making it difficult for defenders to anticipate and respond to threats effectively (Pawlick & Zhu, 2021). Consequently, defenders must rely on robust detection mechanisms, threat intelligence, and adaptive strategies to mitigate the risks posed by imperfect information.
Asymmetric defense is another key concept in cyber conflict, highlighting the inherent imbalance between attackers and defenders. While attackers only need to find one vulnerability to compromise a system, defenders must protect against all potential attack vectors (Taddeo, 2017). This asymmetry puts defenders at a disadvantage, as they must allocate limited resources to cover a vast attack surface, while attackers can concentrate their efforts on finding and exploiting weaknesses (Jasper, 2021).
Like insurgents, cyber defenders are typically outnumbered and outgunned by their adversaries, who have the luxury of choosing when and where to strike (Rid & Buchanan, 2015). To succeed in this environment, defenders must adopt unconventional and adaptive strategies, leveraging their knowledge of the terrain and their ability to blend in with legitimate activities (Bilinski et al., 2021). This may involve employing deception techniques, such as honeypots and decoys, to mislead and disrupt attackers, or using machine learning and artificial intelligence to detect and respond to threats in real-time (Ferguson-Walter et al., 2019).
As the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, embracing an insurgent mindset and leveraging the power of asymmetric defense will be essential for staying one step ahead of adversaries and ensuring the security and resilience of our digital infrastructure.
References:
Bilinski, M., Ferguson-Walter, K., Fugate, S., Mauger, R., & Watson, K. (2021). You only lie twice: A multi-round cyber deception game of questionable veracity. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, 641760.
Ferguson-Walter, K., Fugate, S., Mauger, J., & Major, M. (2019). Game theory for adaptive defensive cyber deception. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Symposium on Hot Topics in the Science of Security (pp. 1-8).
Hou, L., Yin, P., & Dong, J. (2022). Intelligent cyber deception system: Concepts, techniques, and challenges. IEEE Network, 36(1), 258-264.
Jasper, S. (2021). Asymmetric cyber warfare: The future of conflict in cyberspace. International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (IJCWT), 11(2), 1-14.
Kaspersky, E. (2020). The game theory of cyberwarfare. In Kaspersky on Cybersecurity: Evolving Threats and Responses (pp. 25-42). Springer.
Pawlick, J., & Zhu, Q. (2021). Deception as a game-theoretic approach to cyber security: A survey. IEEE Access, 9, 155938-155968.
Rid, T., & Buchanan, B. (2015). Attributing cyber attacks. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(1-2), 4-37.
Sander, K., & Hartmann, A. (2022). Offensive cyber capabilities: Shaping the future of cyber conflict. Survival, 64(2), 121-140.
Taddeo, M. (2017). The limits of deterrence theory in cyberspace. Philosophy & Technology, 30(3), 339-355.